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Domestic Regulation, Sovereignty, and
Scientific Evidence Requirements: A Pessimistic View
Alan 0. Sykes"
The World Trade Organization ("WTO") and its predecessor, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), have been extraordinarily successful at
liberalizing trade in the global economy. The process of liberalization has entailed a
series of negotiations resulting in reciprocal commitments to reduce or eliminate
tariffs, quotas, and other traditional instruments of protectionism. To ensure the
integrity of those commitments, it has been necessary since the inception of GATT to
prohibit member nations from substituting other protectionist devices for those which
they promise to forego.
Domestic regulations, in particular, can disadvantage or exclude foreign suppliers
from export markets. Such regulatory obstacles to exports are known as "technical
barriers to trade." A number of legal principles have evolved in the WTO system to
discipline technical barriers. Regulations that discriminate against foreign suppliers
are the most obvious source of undesirable technical barriers, and WTO law imposes
an obligation on the regulators of member nations to avoid discrimination that
disfavors foreign suppliers.2 Facially nondiscriminatory regulations that impose
* Frank and Bernice Greenberg Professor of Law, University of Chicago. I thank Jessica Romero for
valuable research assistance.
1. The subject of technical barriers and associated disputes is also the source of a rich literature on
WTO law. For a few notable examples, see Robert Howse, Democracy, Science, and Free Trade: Risk
Regulation on Trial at the World Trade Organization, 98 Mich L Rev 2329 (2000) (arguing that WTO
rules on technical barriers can promote deliberative democracy); David G. Victor, The Sanitary and
Pbytosanitary Agreement of the World Trade Organization: An Assessment After Five Years, 32 NYU J Intl
L & Polit 865 (2000) (reviewing the history of disputes in the area). The question of what role
science should play within the WTO is closely related to the "standard of review" employed by
WTO dispute panels in assessing the judgments of national authorities. For an excellent reference
on the standard of review generally, see Stephen P. Croley and John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute
Procedures, Standard of Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 AmJ Intl L 193 (1996).
2. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, as amended ("GATT"), art I, 111(4), reprinted in
John H. Jackson, WilliamJ. Davey and Alan 0. Sykes, 2002 Documents Supplement to Legal Problems of
International Economic Relations 15 (West 4th ed 2002) (hereinafter Documents Supplement). This
general nondiscrimination obligation applies more selectively in services markets, inasmuch as
CbicagoJourna of International Law
relatively greater compliance costs on foreign suppliers can have the same effect as
discriminatory regulations, however, and WTO law thus includes an array of
constraints on domestic regulation that go beyond simple nondiscrimination
requirements.
One such constraint may be termed a "scientific evidence requirement"-a
requirement that certain regulations, generally those enacted for the purpose of
protecting health, safety, or the environment, be based on scientific evidence. The
scientific evidence may go either to the existence of a risk, or to the efficacy of the
regulation in reducing the risk.
The logic of scientific evidence requirements is obvious. If a regulation that is
ostensibly aimed at protecting health, safety, or the environment nevertheless has the
effect of restricting trade, and there is no scientific evidence of any danger to be
avoided or of any reduction in risk as a result of the regulation, then the suspicion
arises that the regulation is disguised protectionism. In effect, a scientific evidence
requirement aids in motive review, and helps to sort regulations between those that
are protectionist and those that seek to promote some legitimate, non-protectionist
regulatory objective.4
But scientific evidence requirements can also create hurdles for regulators who
sincerely pursue objectives other than protectionism. Depending on the context,
scientific evidence may be inconclusive or its conclusions highly tentative or
preliminary. Convincing scientific proof of certain types of risk, particularly low level
risks, may be difficult to produce. And scientists may well disagree about the existence
of a risk or the efficacy of various ways to reduce it. In the face of such scientific
uncertainty, scientific evidence requirements may stand in the way of honest
regulatory efforts to manage risk. These concerns are not merely hypothetical. As
shall be seen below, they surface clearly in WTO disputes.
The uncomfortable interface between scientific evidence requirements and
conditions of scientific uncertainty poses serious challenges for the WTO system,
which has always billed itself as respectful of national regulatory "sovereignty." The
WTO agreements, as well as decisions pursuant to its dispute resolution process, are
replete with references to the right of each member nation to decide on the level of
risk that it wishes to tolerate within its jurisdiction. This deference to national
sovereignty has played an essential political role in quieting opposition to the WTO
discriminatory domestic regulations are often the only sensible device for protecting domestic
industries. Accordingly, nondiscrimination obligations apply only in sectors where members have
agreed to them, and are subject to scheduled exceptions. See General Agreement on Trade in
Services ("GATS"), art XVIL reprinted in Documents Supplemnent at 304.
3. See generally Alan 0. Sykes, Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International Trade, 66 U Chi L
Rev 1 (1999).
4. Id at 17-18.
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and thus in facilitating its core mission. Ideally, one might hope for an
accommodation between scientific evidence requirements and "sovereignty" that
allows both to be respected under WTO law.
My thesis in this essay, however, is that such an accommodation is exceedingly
difficult if not impossible. Meaningful scientific evidence requirements fundamentally
conflict with regulatory sovereignty in all cases of serious scientific uncertainty. WTO
law must then choose between an interpretation of scientific evidence requirements
that essentially eviscerates them and defers to national judgments about "science," or
an interpretation that gives them real bite at the expense of the capacity of national
regulators to choose the level of risk that they will tolerate. The only middle ground
lies in the rare cases where scientific uncertainty is remediable quickly at low cost. I
further argue that "consistency" requirements cannot likely supplant scientific
evidence requirements in a way that satisfactorily accommodates the tension between
the desire to weed out protectionism on the one hand, and the desire to respect
regulatory sovereignty on the other.
A close examination of pertinent WTO decisions to date, most importantly the
decision in the "beef hormones" dispute and its unsuccessful effort to accommodate
scientific evidence requirements with deference to domestic regulators, will provide
the bulk of the argument. Section I provides some general background on WTO law,
while section II considers the cases.
I. SOVEREIGNTY AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE REQUIREMENTS IN
WTO LAW
The only substantial constraints imposed on domestic regulation by the original
GATT Agreement were nondiscrimination requirements, prohibiting discrimination
among trading partners (the "most-favored-nation" obligation of article I) and
between foreign suppliers and domestic suppliers (the "national treatment" obligation
of article III). These obligations were subject to exceptions, such as in the case of
measures "necessary" to protect human, animal or plant health, so long as they were
not "applied in a manner which would constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade" (article XX). Regulators were otherwise free to
adopt whatever regulations they wished, even if the regulations raised the costs of
foreign suppliers disproportionately and thus had the effect of insulating domestic
firms from foreign competition.
The perceived inadequacy of this regime led to pressures for greater constraints
on facially nondiscriminatory yet trade-distorting regulation. During the Tokyo
Round of GATT negotiations in the 1970's, some of the members of the GATT
agreed to a "Standards Code" which introduced a number of new disciplines.
Regulations governing product characteristics became subject to a least restrictive
means requirement even if they were nondiscriminatory, and nations were required to
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use performance standards rather than design standards where possible (for example,
automobiles might be subject to emissions limits, but they could not be required to
use a particular catalytic converter that might be more cheaply available to domestic
manufacturers). Nations were encouraged to adopt international standards where
appropriate to their goals. Some regulatory transparency requirements were also
included, but scientific evidence requirements were not. Indeed, the Code failed to
address a number of important issues in the view of some signatories. Among other
things, it did not apply to regulations governing the way that products were produced,
only to regulations governing the characteristics of the end product. As a result, a
constituency for further negotiation on the subject emerged during the Uruguay
Round of the 1980's.
5
The resulting agreements, which formed the basis for the creation of the WTO,
divided technical barriers issues between an Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade ("TBT Agreement") and an Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures ("SPMs Agreemen').6 Their coverage is mutually exclusive,
with the TBT Agreement applicable to all regulations not covered by the SPMs
Agreement. The SPMs Agreement defines SPMs, roughly, as measures by a member
(a) to protect animal or plant life or health in its territory from the spread of pests or
disease; (b) to protect human or animal life or health in its territory from risks arising
from the presence of an additive, contaminant or disease-causing organism in a food,
beverage or feedstuff, (c) to protect human life or health in its territory from risks
arising from a disease-causing organism carried by an animal or plant; and (d) to
prevent or limit other damage in its territory from the spread of a pest.
The substantive obligations differ between the two agreements in important
ways. The TBT Agreement contains a tight prohibition on discrimination, for
example,' while the SPMs Agreement prohibits measures that "arbitrarily or
unjustifiably discriminate between Members where identical or similar conditions
prevail."9 The permissibility of limited discrimination under the SPMs Agreement is
aimed at situations where the risk is greater with goods from particular sources (for
example, beef from England during the mad cow scare).
5. For a detailed history of GATT rules in this area, and a discussion of the changes made by the
WTO agreements, see Alan 0. Sykes, Product Standards for Internationally Integrated Goods Markets
63-86 (Brookings 1995).
6. These agreements are modeled on similar provisions in the NAFTA. See North American Free
Trade Agreement, art 709-24, 901-15, 32 ILM 289, 377-383, 386-396 (1993), reprinted in
Documents Supplement at 512, 573-83, 590-602 (cited in note 2).
7. The division results from the way that negotiations were structured-technical barriers in general
were entrusted to one negotiating group, but those of particular relevance to agriculture (the SPMs)
were left to the agricultural negotiating group.
8. TBT Agreement, art 2.1, reprinted in Documents Supplement at 150 (cited in note 2).
9. SPMs Agreement, art 2.3, reprinted in Documents Supplement at 122 (cited in note 2).
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By contrast, the SPMs Agreement contains significantly tighter scientific
evidence requirements. The TBT Agreement merely requires that regulations "not be
more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective," which can
include the "protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the
environment. In assessing such risks, relevant elements of consideration are, inter alia:
available scientific and technical information ... ." Seemingly, the only obligation
under the TBT Agreement with respect to scientific evidence is that it be
"considered."
Under the SPMs Agreement, however, "ina]embers shall ensure that any
sanitary or phytosanitary measure ... is based on scientific principles and is not
maintained without sufficient scientific evidence."" Measures which conform to
relevant international standards are presumptively in conformity with the
requirements of the Agreement, and Members may only introduce or maintain
measures "which result in a higher level of ... protection than would be achieved by
measures based on the relevant international standards ... if there is a scientific
justification, or as a consequence of the level of... protection a Member determines to
be appropriate" in accordance with other provisions of the Agreement governing the
assessment of risks.12 The risk assessment provisions state that "[m]embers shall
ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary measures are based on an assessment, as
appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks to human, animal or plant life or health,
taking into account risk assessment techniques developed by the relevant international
organizations. In the assessment of risks, Members shall take into account available
scientific evidence ... 13 An exception exists for cases "where relevant scientific
evidence is insufficient." Then, "a Member may provisionally adopt ... measures on
the basis of available pertinent information," provided that they "shall seek to obtain
the additional information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk and
review the ... measure accordingly within a reasonable period of time."4 As indicated
in the next section, these scientific evidence requirements of the SPMs Agreement
have served as a basis for holding that several challenged regulations violate WTO
obligations.
As the TBT and SPMs Agreements created important new obligations,
however, they also purported to ensure that member nations could continue to
regulate to avoid risks that they did not wish to tolerate. The SPMs Agreement
recites at its outset that "no Member should be prevented from adopting or enforcing
10. TBT Agreement, art 2.2, reprinted in Documents Supplement at 150 (cited in note 2).
11. SPMs Agreement, art 2.2, reprinted in Documents Supplement at 122 (cited in note 2).
12. SPMs Agreement, art 3.3, reprinted in Documents Supplement at 123 (cited in note 2).
13. SPMs Agreement, arts 5.1-5.2, reprinted in Documents Supplement at 123-24 (cited in note 2).
14. SPMs Agreement, art 5.7, reprinted in Documents Supplement at 124 (cited in note 2).
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measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health ... "' Likewise,
the TBT agreement insists that "no country should be prevented from taking
measures necessary ... for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, of
the environment ... at the levels it considers appropriate ... ,6 The evident purpose of
these statements is to reassure member nations that the WTO is not in the business
of deciding which risks are acceptable and which are not. WTO law simply aims to
ensure that the regulation of genuine risks is not more deleterious to trade than
necessary. In this respect, both agreements promise to respect regulatory sovereignty
regarding risk tolerance. The next section will suggest that the scientific evidence
requirements of the SPMs Agreement, as interpreted by the WTO Appellate Body,
have rendered this promise in no small part illusory.
II. SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE REQUIREMENTS IN WTO DISPUTE
RESOLUTION
As noted, the role of scientific evidence requirements is much greater in
situations that implicate the SPMs Agreement. Accordingly, they are the focus of
attention here.
A. THE SPMs CASES
The scientific evidence requirements of the SPMs Agreement have played a
significant role in three reported WTO decisions to date involving European imports
of beef, Australian imports of salmon, and Japanese imports of certain agricultural
products. In each case, the regulation in question was held to violate WTO law.
1. European Community/Beef Hormones
The beef hormones dispute is one of the longest running trade disputes in the
modern trading system. It stems from a decision by the European Union to prohibit
the administration of certain growth hormones (including estrogen, progesterone and
testosterone) to cattle. Europe not only prohibited the use of these hormones
domestically, but banned the importation of meat and meat products from cattle that
had received these hormones abroad. These growth hormones are widely used by
ranchers in the United States and Canada. After the entry into force of the
agreements creating the WTO, the United States and Canada quickly brought a case
alleging violations of the SPMs Agreement. A dispute panel found for the
complainants on a number of grounds, some of which were reversed by the WTO
Appellate Body. But the Appellate Body ultimately agreed with the panel that the
European regulation violated WTO law and, in particular, the scientific evidence
15. SPMs Agreement, Preamble, reprinted in Documents Supplement at 121 (cited in note 2).
16. TBT Agreement, Preamble, reprinted in Documents Supplement at 149 (cited in note 2).
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requirements of the SPMs Agreement. It is instructive to examine the Appellate
Body's analysis in some detail.
Note first that the European regulation was nondiscriminatory, and thus beyond
the reach of the basic nondiscrimination obligations that have existed since the
inception of the GATT system. But it is the type of nondiscriminatory regulation
that has a disparate impact on foreign trade. Meat packers in nations that permit the
use of hormones cannot export to Europe unless they deal with ranchers who
segregate part of their herds to be raised as hormone free, and generate the supporting
evidence of that practice necessary to satisfy European regulators. These added costs
may not be worth the bother to packers who anticipate that only a modest portion of
their business will involve European exports, and indeed we know that the initial
impact of the hormone beef regulation was to reduce US exports from about $100
million annually to zero.' Whether intended as a protectionist measure or not,
therefore, the effect of such a regulation is to disadvantage foreign suppliers relative to
domestic suppliers, and it affords a nice example of why nondiscrimination obligations
alone are perceived as inadequate to address technical barriers.
But is the regulation disguised protectionism that the system should condemn?
Its history suggests not. The first version of the regulation was enacted following
widely publicized adverse reactions to the ingestion of beef from cattle treated with
the hormone DES, such as the development of breasts in young children. The
European Council of Agricultural Ministers responded with a zero risk policy,
banning all growth hormones whether or not they had been shown to produce adverse
reactions in humans. 8 Although there is little doubt that the regulation improved the
competitive position of European beef producers and they no doubt welcomed it in
part on that basis, the impetus for the measure can be traced clearly to an episode that
raised bona fide concerns about the safety of growth hormones.
But the central issue before the WTO was whether the measure rested on an
acceptable scientific footing, and in particular whether it was "based on" a risk
assessment as required by article 5.1 of the SPMs Agreement. In addressing this
question, the WTO Appellate Body tipped its hat often to the notion that national
regulators have the right to regulate low level risks. It noted that the requirement of a
risk assessment does not mean that "a certain magnitude or threshold level of risk be
demonstrated"-"such a quantitative requirement finds no basis" in the Agreement.' 9
Further, "Article 5.1 does not require that the risk assessment must necessarily
embody only the view of a majority of the relevant scientific community.
17. See Alan 0. Sykes, Product Standards for Internationally Integrated Goods Markets 17 (Brookings 1995).
18. Id at 16-17.
19. World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), 186, WTO Doc No WT/DS26/AB/R (Feb 13, 1998) (hereinafter Hormones
Report) (emphasis omitted).
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[R]esponsible and representative governments may act in good faith on the basis of
what, at a given time, may be a divergent opinion .... "" The requirement that a
measure be "based on" a risk assessment is simply "a substantive requirement that
there be a rational relationship between the measure and the risk assessment."'
Nevertheless, the regulation failed to pass muster. The Appellate Body pointed
to studies of the safety of growth hormones done for the Codex Alimentarius, an
international standard-setting body connected to the World Health Organization,
which concluded that the use of the hormones in question was "safe" if they were used
in accordance with good veterinary practice.2 Hence, these scientific studies did not
"rationally support" the European measure.23
Europe pointed to a number of studies that document a relationship between
hormone ingestion and cancer, a linkage that has recently been confirmed by studies
of women undergoing hormone replacement therapy, but these were deemed
inadequate because "[t]he Monographs and the articles and opinions of individual
scientists have not evaluated the carcinogenic potential of those hormones when used
specifically for growth promotion purposes. Moreover, they do not evaluate the specific
potential for carcinogenic effects arising from the presence in food', more specifically,
meat or meat products' of residues of the hormones in dispute.
Europe also produced an expert witness before the dispute panel, one Dr. Lucier,
who opined that the ingestion of growth hormone residues in meat would indeed
cause some small number of additional cancers. He stated that of every one million
women, 110,000 would contract breast cancer, of which several thousand cases would
likely result from the intake of exogenous estrogens from all sources. "And by my
estimates one of those 110,000 would come from eating meat containing oestrogens as
a growth promoter, if used as prescribed." The Appellate Body might have simply
noted that Dr. Lucier's opinion was not available to the European Union at the time
the regulation was promulgated, and hence that the regulation could not be "based on"
it. But that would have left Europe the opportunity simply to repromulgate the
regulation in reliance on Dr. Lucier's analysis. Instead, the Appellate Body noted "that
this opinion by Dr. Lucier does not purport to be the result of scientific studies
carried out by him or under his supervision focusing specifically on residues of
hormones in meat from cattle fattened with such hormones. Accordingly, ... the
single divergent opinion expressed by Dr. Lucier is not reasonably sufficient....
20. Id at 1194.
21. Id at 193.
22. Id at $ 196.
23. Id at 197.
24. Id at 199 (emphasis in original).
25. Id at$ 198 n 181.
26. Id at$ 198.
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Europe's final line of defense was to point to the dangers of hormone abuse by
cattle ranchers. Even if the Codex studies were right that hormones are "safe" when
used in accordance with good veterinary practice, some ranchers might be tempted to
overuse them, leaving higher and more dangerous residues. To this argument, the
Appellate Body responded in essence that Europe had produced no empirical study of
the risks of hormone abuse that demonstrated the magnitude or severity of the
problem. Accordingly, if the justification for the regulation lay in the fear of excess
residues attributable to hormone abuse, it still was not "based on" a risk assessment.27
2. Australia/Salmon
Australia has developed a successful salmon industry, and insists that the
importation of uncooked salmon from other nations creates a risk that certain diseases
of salmon prevalent elsewhere will be introduced into the Australian fish population.
Accordingly, it enacted a ban on the importation of salmon from various places,
including Canada. Canada brought a challenge to the ban contending, inter alia, that
the ban was not "based on" a risk assessment.
In reviewing this claim, the Appellate Body again tipped its hat to the right of
member nations to set their own risk levels, indicating that a Member may permissibly
elect a zero risk policy. But the regulation must nevertheless be based on a "risk
assessment" The requirements of a "risk assessment" can be found in the definition of
the term in Annex A to the SPMs Agreement. A risk assessment must:
(1) identify the diseases whose entry, establishment or spread a Member wants to
prevent within its territory, as well as the potential biological and economic
consequences associated with the entry, establishment or spread of these diseases;
(2) evaluate the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of these diseases, as well
as the associated potential biological and economic consequences; and
(3) evaluate the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of these diseases
according to the SPS measures which might be applied.
In interpreting these requirements, the Appellate Body held that
it is not sufficient that a risk assessment conclude that there is a possibility of entry,
establishment or spread of diseases and associated biological and economic
consequences. A proper risk assessment of this type must evaluate the 'likelihood',
i.e., the 'probability, of entry, establishment or spread of diseases and associated
biological and economic consequences as well as the likelihood', i.e., 'probability',
of entry, establishment or spread of diseases according to the SPS measures which might
be applied.
"The likelihood may be expressed either quantitatively or qualitatively."
31
27. Id at 1207.
28. World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, Australia-Measures Affecting Importation
of Salmon, 125, WTO Doc No WT/DS18/AB/R (Oct 20,1998) (hereinafter Salmon Report).
29. Id at T 121 (emphasis in original).
30. Id at T 123 (emphasis in original).
31. Id at 124.
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Australia produced a government report that noted the possibility of twenty-four
diseases being spread through imports of uncooked salmon, and offered it as the "risk
assessment" on which the regulation was based. The Appellate Body found the report
adequate as to the first criterion above-it identified the diseases at issue and their
potential consequences. But as to the second criterion, the Appellate Body found that
the report did not adequately "evaluate the likelihood" of the spread of disease through
importation of salmon. It based that conclusion on the dispute panel's finding that the
report contained "general and vague statements of mere possibility of adverse effects
occurring; statements which constitute neither a quantitative nor a qualitative
assessment of probability."32 Likewise, the Appellate Body found the report
inadequate under the third criterion because, although it identified various options for
reducing the risks in question, it "d[id] not, in any substantial way, evaluate or assess
their relative effectiveness in reducing the overall disease risk.""
In short, even though a zero risk policy is acceptable according to the Appellate
Body, an adequate risk assessment must nevertheless evaluate the probability of the
spread of disease, and must do so for the various alternative regulatory options as well
as for the status quo ante in the absence of regulation. The probability may be
assessed "qualitatively," but a conclusion that a mere "possibility" exists that disease
may spread apparently falls short of a "qualitative" assessment of "probability."
3. Japan/Agricultural Products
Coddling moth is a pest that lowers the yield for a variety of fruit products, but it
has not yet been detected in Japan. To prevent the introduction of the pest into Japan,
the government imposes strict regulations on imported fruit, requiring that it be
treated effectively with some combination of fumigation and cold storage to kill the
moth at any stage of its life cycle. The United States objected to one important feature
of the regulatory scheme, which in essence required an elaborate scientific
investigation of the efficacy of measures to kill the moth for every individual variety of
a given product (for example, a separate study would have to be conducted for
Macintosh apples and Granny Smith apples). Unless a study had been conducted for
a particular variety that proved the efficacy of pest control measures to the satisfaction
of Japanese regulators, that variety could not be imported into Japan.
The United States challenged the evidence on familiar grounds-that it was not
"based on" a risk assessment and was maintained without sufficient scientific evidence.
The Appellate Body affirmed the panel's ruling that the language in article 2.2,
prohibiting measures that are "maintained without sufficient scientific evidence,"
requires a rational relationship between the measure and the scientific evidence
32. Id at 129.
33. Id at 133.
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presented.' The dispute panel's factual determination (not appealable) that no
rational relationship existed to the available scientific evidence turned heavily on the
fact that Japan could not point to a single instance in which an approved method for
killing the moth on one variety of fruit had not proven effective when used on another
variety of the same fruit. Although Japan could produce some scientific evidence of
possible differences across varieties that might make treatments less effective for one
variety than another, the mere possibility of a difference was not enough-the panel
apparently wanted some affirmative evidence of differences in the efficacy of treatment
measures across varieties to justify Japan's policy.
Japan also attempted to justify the policy as "provisional" pursuant to article 5.7
governing conditions where "scientific evidence was insufficient" This defense failed
because Japan could not show that it was engaged in an active research program "to
obtain the additional information necessary for a more objective assessmene' or that it
had reviewed its provisional measures within a "reasonable period of time."'
B. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS
Beginning with the hormones decision, the factual propositions that underlie the
Appellate Body's conclusions are surely correct. No empirical scientific analysis was
presented to the WTQ that specifically examined the human health risks from the
ingestion of beef containing growth hormone residues, and that concluded that a risk
to human health was present. Dr. Lucier's opinion did not rest on any such study that
he had conducted, but was simply an extrapolation from the now well-known fact that
estrogen ingestion causes an increase in the incidence of breast cancer. And no
empirical scientific analysis was presented that examined the risks associated with the
possible failure of ranchers to observe good veterinary practice.
Yet, one must ask what the European Union could reasonably have done to
bolster the scientific case. Precisely how does one conduct a study of "the specific
potential for carcinogenic effects arising from the presence in food', more specifically,
meat or meat products' of residues of the hormones in dispute"?37 In theory, one
might conduct cross-sectional studies comparing cancer rates in nations that permit
growth hormones with rates in nations that ban them. But there are innumerable
sources of external estrogens besides residues in meat, and innumerable other factors
that may affect cancer rates. Can one hope to control for all these factors convincingly?
34. World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural
Products, 84, WTO Doc No WT/DS76/AB/R (Feb 22, 1999).
35. World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel, Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products,
8.42, WTO Doc No WT/DS76/R (Oct 27, 1998).
36. World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural
Products at H 92-93 (cited in note 34).
37. Hormones Report at 199 (cited in note 19) (emphasis in original).
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And even if one could, everyone (including Europe) agrees that the marginal
contribution to cancer rates from meat hormone residues is likely to be small-could
one ever hope to identify such small effects at conventional statistical confidence
levels?
Are animal studies the answer? Would studies of low dose hormone
administration to lab rats satisfy the Appellate Body? How could one be confident
that any results from such studies carry over to humans, whichever way the result
came out? And if the issue is the effect of the low residues in meat that might cause
cancer at the rate of one case per million population (Dr. Lucier's estimate), how large
would the population of test rats have to be for statistically convincing results to be
observed?
Finally, if the concern is the risk of hormone misuse, how precisely does one
study that risk? One suspects that a questionnaire to a random sample of US
ranchers, asking them whether they abuse growth hormones in violation of sound
veterinary practice, might yield a negative response regardless of the truth. Could
random samples of meat entering Europe at the border be tested for excessive
residues? Would excessive residues found on occasion demonstrate an important
problem of abuse? How would one determine the risks to human health of those
excessive residues, any more than one could empirically assess the risks from the low
level residues associated with sound veterinary practice?
Although I am not a toxicologist, I can claim to know enough about empirical
research to say that statistically convincing studies demonstrating the existence of a
small health risk from hormone residues in meat are likely to be exceedingly difficult
to generate. One can observe that the hormones in question are known carcinogens,
and that some residue of these hormones exists in the meat. But it is likely impossible
to know with any degree of statistical confidence whether these small residues, when
added to the diets of people who are exposed to the same hormones from many other
sources (not to mention numerous other carcinogens), do or do not cause a few more
cases of cancer at the margin.
Consequently, the Appellate Bodys insistence that Europe point to highly
particularized studies showing a risk from hormone residues in meat likely presents an
insurmountable hurdle. The effect is to make it impossible for national regulators to
elect to eliminate low level risks that are not susceptible to rigorous demonstration.
That may not be bad policy, and indeed it might well be the case that Europe's ban on
growth hormones would flunk any sort of careful cost-benefit analysis. But if scientific
evidence requirements are construed in a way that makes it impossible to regulate
risks that are not demonstrable through particularized scientific studies, they surely
clash with the notion that WTO law is not meant to tell member states which risks
they must tolerate and which risks they may elect to avoid.
The Australian Salmon case, in my view, is similar in this regard. While
pretending to permit nations to embrace a zero risk policy, it simultaneously holds
that a credible scientific opinion affirming the possibility of a risk is not enough for
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even a "qualitative" assessment of "probability" as required by article 5.1. To some
readers, as well as this writer, the Appellate Body's position on this issue borders on
the incoherent. And whatever it is that must be done to count as an acceptable
assessment of "probability," it must be done for all of the regulatory options under
consideration. One again wonders exactly what it would take in the way of additional
research for Australia to satisfy the Appellate Body-how can one assess the
"probability" of disease spreading through imported goods if that unfortunate
eventuality has (thankfully) not yet transpirede Would it suffice to demonstrate that
live disease organisms reside in the carcasses of uncooked salmon? Seemingly not, as
that demonstration should not be a difficult one. And if that is not enough, how does
one proceed to isolate the "probability" that such organisms might spread to the live
fish population in Australiae
The Japanese measures at issue in the agricultural products case were similarly
predicated on unproven risks, but at least that case hinted at a roadmap for further
research. In particular, the panel decision implied that if Japan could convincingly
identify one instance in which coddling moth treatment effective on one variety of
fruit was ineffective on another, it might be able to justify its varietal testing
requirements. And had Japan been actively engaged in research on possible varietal
differences in treatment efficacy, it might have been able to justify its measures for the
short term as provisional. But this decision too seems to stand for the proposition that
over the long term, affirmative and convincing scientific evidence must be adduced to
establish the presence of the risk in question. Bona fide concerns about possible risks
are not enough.
Consider, however, the alternative. In the hormones case, the Appellate Body
might have written an opinion that would permit Europe to rely on minority opinions
like those of Dr. Lucier going forward, simply insisting that such an opinion be in
place at the time that a regulation is enacted so that the regulation can fairly be said to
have been "based on" it. An adequate "risk assessment" would exist whenever a
consultant could colorably extrapolate from a known risk to suggest that a smaller risk
was present though not statistically demonstrable-minimal exposure to a substance
known to be dangerous in large quantity could always be regulated, for example, as
might exposure to substances bearing chemical similarity to those known to be
dangerous. Indeed, if experience with the American tort system teaches us anything, it
is that determined parties can almost always find consultants willing to opine that risk
is present, whether from Bendectin, Agent Orange, silicone breast implants,
electromagnetic radiation from cell phones, or any number of other sources. An
interpretation that accepts the minority opinions of consultants as "risk assessments
effectively converts scientific evidence requirements into minimal procedural hurdles
that can be met easily by any determined regulators, high-minded and protectionist
alike. The right of member nations to refuse risks that they do not wish to tolerate
would be preserved, but the opportunities for mischief would surely be enhanced as
well.
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Of course, the problem here is limited to cases of genuine scientific uncertainty.
Cases surely arise in principle where the science is so clear that no doubts exist, but I
suspect that these cases will rarely make it so far as to trigger a WTO dispute, and
certainly that type of case is not what the WTO has seen in practice so far.
The only other class of cases in which the Appellate Bodys insistence on hard
supporting evidence might not intrude importantly on regulatory sovereignty are
those in which scientific uncertainty can be laid to rest reasonably cheaply and quickly.
A nation that eschews obvious and inexpensive opportunities for research that will
confirm or deny the wisdom of its regulatory policy can hardly complain very loudly if
WTO law requires those opportunities to be pursued. But again, these cases are
perhaps unlikely to be the ones that provoke international disputes. It is also
noteworthy that nothing in WTO treaty text or in WTO decisions to date seems to
condition the stringency of the scientific evidence requirement on the technical and
economic feasibility of the research program to eliminate scientific uncertainty.
Technical and economic feasibility is indeed a factor to be considered in deciding
whether a regulatory measure represents the least restrictive means,8 but WTO
jurisprudence does not yet bring similar ideas to bear in judging the acceptability of a
national "risk assessment."
C. CONSISTENCY REQUIREMENTS AS AN ALTERNATIVE
Before concluding, one might reasonably ask whether alternative devices exist for
policing regulatory mischief that would perform reasonably well and that would pose
less of a threat to regulatory sovereignty than tight scientific evidence requirements.
One option deserving of careful consideration in this regard is a consistency
requirement, which also finds expression in WTO law. Article 5.5 of the SPMs
Agreement provides that "[wJith the objective of achieving consistency in ... sanitary
or phytosanitary protection..., each Member shall avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable
distinctions in the levels it considers to be appropriate for different situations, if such
distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade"
A nice application of this principle may be found in the Australian Salmon case,
in which the Appellate Body affirmed an alternative basis for declaring that Australia's
ban on salmon imports was impermissible. In particular, the evidence seemed to be
quite clear that the risk to the Australian salmon population from the spread of
disease was considerably greater from certain activities that Australia did not regulate
at all-in particular, the importation of ornamental aquarium fish that might be
released into local waters (recall the Asian carp and Northern snakehead problems in
the United States presently) and the importation of live herring to use as a baitfish-
than it was from the importation of uncooked salmon. Because the evidence of a
38. SPMs Agreement, art 5.6, reprinted in Documents Supplement at 124 (cited in note 2).
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greater hazard from these activities seemed compelling and Australia had no
persuasive justification for ignoring these other hazards on the one hand, while
regulating a lesser hazard from a product that just happened to compete with an
important domestic industry on the other, the distinction was found to be arbitrary or
unjustifiable and a disguised restriction. 9
The virtue of resting the decision on the consistency issue alone is at first blush
considerable. No longer would the WTO seemingly be telling nations that they could
not regulate in the face of potentially intractable scientific uncertainty. Rather, nations
would be free to regulate a hazard that was somewhat speculative, but only if they did
so evenhandedly without regard to which sources of hazard were competitive irritants
to domestic producers. In a circumstance like the Australian case, a weakened
scientific evidence requirement would not prevent suspicious regulatory behavior from
being policed.
One difficulty, of course, is that regulators will often be able to offer plausible
reasons why one type of hazard is regulated and one is not. The costs of regulation
may be much higher in one case than another, for example, or differences in the
efficacy of regulatory options may make some types of regulation futile. If such
arguments are rejected in favor of a finding of an "arbitrary and unjustifiable"
distinction, the perceived intrusion on regulatory sovereignty may be no less than
before.
There is also the difficult issue of which regulatory distinctions are comparable
for consistency purposes. The Australian case was unusual in that one could look to
the identical risk to the identical fish population from multiple sources. In the beef
hormones case, by contrast, what regulations (or non-regulations) would one examine
for consistency? In fact, the dispute panel examined several, including the policy of the
European Community to permit certain carcinogenic medications to be used for
growth promotion in piglets, and the policy of doing nothing to regulate the ingestion
of naturally occurring hormones, such as those present in eggs. In the end, the
Appellate Body found no violation of article 5.5 because some of the distinctions were
not arbitrary or unjustifiable (such as ignoring the hormones that occur naturally),
and others could not be said to be a disguised restriction on trade (the medication
used on piglets)."
A serious requirement of consistency in regulation probably could not be met by
any nation-it is well known, for example, that the cost per life saved varies hugely
across public safety and health regulations in the United States.4' The only way to
39. Salnon Report at: 234-40 (cited in note 28).
40. Hornones Report at 1246 (cited in note 19).
41. See, for example, Lisa Heinzerling Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 Yale L J 1981, 2042-64
(1998); Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political Theory
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avoid the appearance of rampant inconsistencies will be to narrow the comparisons to
regulations that appear similar in some superficial way (in the hormones case, other
food regulation, other meat regulation, etc.). Alternatively, one can simply tolerate
inconsistencies by recognizing that they are pervasive and rarely motivated by
protectionism, as the Appellate Body essentially so found in the hormones case when
it addressed the use of carcinogenic medication in piglets. Either way, one quickly
becomes pessimistic about the ability of consistency requirements to step into the
breach should scientific evidence requirements become more deferential.
III. CONCLUSION
The battle between the proponents of open trade and the proponents of national
"sovereignty" has been central to the political fortunes of the World Trade
Organization since its inception. Defenders of the system regularly insist that the
tension is illusory, and that WTO rules do not intrude on proper national
prerogatives. Without taking any normative position on the matter, this essay has
argued that in some contexts a serious tension indeed arises, and that the goals of open
trade and respect for national sovereignty can be irreconcilably at odds to the point
that one must give way. With particular regard to the scientific evidence requirements
of the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, the WTO
Appellate Body has embarked on a course that unmistakably elevates the policing of
trade restrictive measures above the ability of national governments to address risk in
the face of scientific uncertainty. There is little alternative to such a policy if scientific
evidence requirements are to serve as more than window dressing.
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